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BUFFALO LAW REVIEW
effect is to control a business which provides a market for stolen property."
This control is achieved by granting licenses to individuals who are not likely
to receive stolen property and refusing to grant licenses to those people that
the commissioner decides are prone to acting as receivers of stolen property.
It seems clear that the majority opinion is more likely to secure effective
and harmonious business regulation by vesting the power to regulate different
aspects of trade in those agencies that are best qualified to handle them. The
Commissioner of Licenses may have been well meaning in his refusal to issue
a license in order to protect the neighborhood, however he would have been
powerless to protect the same area from a glue factory or a slaughterhouse
because they do not require a license. It follows that the holding of Picone v.
Commissioner of Licenses is applicable, "As the commissioner does not deny
that petitioner is a fit and proper person to operate a junk (boat), it follows
that his action in refusing to grant a license to the appellant was, however well
intentioned, in a legal sense an abuse of his decretion."'1
CERTAIN SiTuATioNs REQuIE AGENCIES To GRANT FuLL HEARING
The State Residential Rent Law- 2 was amended in 195733 to make it
mandatory for the Rent Administrator to use a sales price as the valuation
base in a rent adjustment proceeding, when certain conditions exist.3 4 The
conditions are: (1) The sale must be bona fide and within the period from
March 15, 1953 to the time of filing the application; (2) The transaction must
be at arm's length, on normal financing terms at a readily ascertainable price;
(3) It must be unaffected by special circumstances such as forced sale, ex-
change of property, package deal, work sale, or sale to a cooperative.-a In
Realty Agency, Inc. v. Weaver,36 the Court of Appeals considered a case where
a petition asking that the sales price be used as opposed to assessed valuation
was denied by the Rent Administrator based upon his determination that the
sale in question was not an "arm's length" transaction and was affected by
special circumstances. The facts show that the stockholders of petitioner's
principal held a 35 per cent interest in the operating profits and proceeds of
sale of the property purchased. It is upon this ground, after the normal routine
investigation, no hearing being granted to the petitioner, that the Adminis-
trator denied the petition for rent increase sufficient to allow a 6 per cent net
annual return on the basis of the purchase price. The Court reversed the deci-
sion of the Appellate Division 1 which upheld the Rent Administrator's action.
The Court decided that on the face of the record there was no substantial evi-
dence to support the Administrator's finding that the consumated bargain was
31. 241 N.Y. 157, 162, 149 N.E. 336, 341 (1925).
32. N.Y. Sess. Laws, 1946 ch. 274 et seq.
33. N.Y. Sess. Laws, 1957 ch. 755, § 4(4) (a) (1).
34. Ackerman v. Weaver, 6 N.Y.2d 283, 189 N.Y.S.2d 646 (1959).
35. Supra note7 33.
36. 7 N.Y.2d 249, 196 N.Y.S.2d 953 (1959).
37. 8 A.D.2d 773, 186 N.Y.S.2d 428 (1st Dep't 1959).
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other than an arm's length transaction. It further decided that the parties
to the sale appeared to act as adverse parties, standing upon their respective
rights and neither under the other's control. The record did not show that
the seller sold for less than the fair market value of the property. The Court
also decided that the term "special circumstances" must be measured by the
doctrine of ejusdem generis. The specific words which follow the general term
"special circumstances" reflect a type of circumstance where the price yields
a distorted reflection of value, and the general term must be interpreted to
encompass and be circumscribed by all of the same type of circumstances. No
such distortion appeared on the record.
Before 1957, the Rent Administrator had discretion as to the basis for
valuation to be used and his discretion would be honored provided it rested
on sound considerations in fact and law.38 It has been recognized that the
findings or determinations of administrative bodies, supported by substantial
evidence and being neither unreasonable, arbitrary nor capricious, may not
be disturbed by the courts.3 9 The few cases that have been decided on this
matter since the 1957 amendment do not indicate a change in the respect
which had been accorded the Administrator's determination. Of course, the
Administrator no longer has discretion to fix the valuation basis but must use
sales price if the sale fulfills the conditions in the statute. Whether the sale
fulfills the conditions in the statute is, however, still an administrative deter-
mination. One case said that the Administrator's action was illegal, unreason-
able and arbitrary, in refusing to accept sales price as the valuation basis and
in denying a hearing or examination of the facts.which the petitioner attempted
to adduce as a basis for its requested increase.0 Later, it was held that it is
within the sole discretion of the Rent Administrator to determine in each case
whether the transaction is a package deal within the intention of the statute.41
As late as December, 1959, a Supreme Court case held that there is no authority
making it mandatory that the Rent Administrator grant a hearing. It is within
his discretion. It further said that sometimes questions of fact may arise that
cannot be resolved without a hearing. 'If there is ample basis in the record
for the Administrator's determination, it will not be upset as arbitrary or
capricious4
The Court of Appeals in the instant case follows the previously mentioned
cases. The Court holds that the refusal by the Administrator to examine the
preferred evidence of the petitioner, under the facts of this case was arbitrary.
38. Kaufman v. Abrams, - Misc. -, 141 N.Y.S.2d 716 (Sup. Ct. 1955), aff'd 286 App.
Div. 998, 145 N.Y.S.2d 310 (1st Dep't 1955).
39. Staten Island Edison Corp. v. Maltbie, 296 N.Y. 374, 73 N.E.2d 705 (1947);
People ex rel. Cqnsolidated Water Co. of Utica v. Maltbie, 275 N.Y. 357, 9 N.E.2d 961
(1937).
40. Management Holding Corp. v. Weaver, 10 Misc. 2d 1000, 169 N.YS.2d 763 (Sup.
Ct. 1957).
41. Halperin v. Caputa, 21 Misc. 2d 413, 194 N.Y.S.2d 414 (Sup. Ct. 1959).
42. Kellar v. Herman, 20 Misc. 2d 842, 195 N.Y.S.2d 489 (Sup. Ct. 1959).
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It interprets the statute as requiring the Administrator to regard all relevant
and nonrefuted objective facts and to hold hearings and make inquiries when
warranted by the facts in light of the standards of Section 4 before reaching
his determination. This decision cannot be interpreted as requiring a standard
for determination different from one resting on sound considerations in fact
and law,43 or one, substantially supported by the evidence.
44
TENDENCY OF COURT TO MODiFY ADmiNISTRATVE PUNISHMENT
The petitioner, an employee of the New York City Transit Authority for
over twenty years, was charged by the Authority with stealing several fares.
After a hearing before the Authority, in which she was represented by counsel
and testified in her own behalf, the hearing officer sustained the charges. Upon
her dismissal by the Authority, she brought an Article 7845 proceeding to have
this determination reviewed by the courts. The Appellate Division 46 modified
the discipline from outright dismissal to a six month suspension. The Court
of Appeals, in Mitthauer v. Patterson,47 by a 5-2 decision, affirmed the Appel-
late Division.
Section 1296 of the Civil Practice Act provides: "In a proceeding
under this article, the questions involving the merits to be determined
upon the hearing are the following only:
5-(a). Whether the respondent abused his discretion in imposing
the measure of punishment or penalty or discipline involved in the
determination."
There is little or no doubting the fact that subdivision 5-(a) was added
in 1955 to overrule cases which held that no judicial review could be had of the
measure of punishment imposed by administrative agencies acting within their
powers.48
The first issue faced by the Court of Appeals was whether subdivision 5-(a)
should apply at all to this case. In 1957 this subdivision had been interpreted
by the Appellate Division in Stolz v. Board of Regents as follows: " . . . the
statute authorizes us to set aside a determination by an administrative agency,
only if the measure of punishment or discipline is so disproportionate to the
offense, in light of all the circumstances, as to be shocking to one's sense of
fairness." 49 The Transit Authority argued that the dismissal of an employee
who has stolen her employer's property does not shock anyone, and that the
Appellate Division abused its discretion in mitigating the punishment. The
Court of Appeals agreed that the evidence supported the finding of guilt and
43. Supra note 38.
44. Supra note 39.
45. N.Y. Civ. Prac. Act Article 78 is entitled "Proceeding Against A Body Or Officer"
and sets forth the procedure under which the actions of a governmental agency can be
reviewed by the courts.
46. 8 A.D.2d 953, 190 N.Y.S.2d 431 (2d Dep't 1959).
47. 8 N.Y.2d 37, 201 N.Y.S.2d 321 (1960).
48. See Barsky v. Board of Regents, 305 N.Y. 89, 111 N.E.2d 222 (1953).
49. 4 A.D.2d 361, 364, 165 N.Y.S.2d 179, 182 (3d Dep't 1957).
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